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DISCUSSION
OLSON:
Let me start by saying that I found Randy Barnett's comments
very persuasive. In general, the divergence between one's moral estimate of promises and what the law has historically enforced has
turned out to hinge on what are effectively evidentiary considerations. The doctrine of consideration, the complexities of offer and
acceptance, the requirement of a writing, are all methods by which a
court can reduce the risk of being mistaken about when there was an
actual promise. They raise the requirement of proof, particularly in
cases where there is a high likelihood of honest error or of fraudulent claims that a promise was made. The general rule has been that
if you can enable a high enough mound of evidence, you can get just
about any promise enforced, except for a promise to enslave oneself, where there are historical reasons for an exception.
The difference with unconscionability is that it really puts what
I call a penny in the fuse box. It means that no matter how hard you
try, no matter how clear the evidence of the other side's consent,
you just cannot do it.
In many ways I agree with Professor Farnsworth that the courts
are actually not as badly off as my anecdotes might suggest. Perhaps
contract is alive and well, or at least recuperating on a Carnival
Cruise ship. And many sports-related assumption of risk cases have
gone in the right direction.
Still, I am not entirely comforted to know that individual liberty
has been extinguished only in cases involving consumers and small
producers. Those are important categories. It seems to me that we
may want oil companies to continue giving franchises to people with
a high school education rather than demanding post-graduate
study. But if those with low education are given special rights to
litigate the unconscionability of their franchise agreements, companies are going to draw the opposite conclusion.
Even if deals between large businesses or wealthy persons are
seldom voided on grounds of unconscionability or public policy, the
arguments can still give them a powerful weapon to use against each
other in litigation. If such a claim does not win at trial, it can still be
a way to avoid summary judgment, get more access to discovery,
and thus raise the imposition value of the case. We may observe
that Ivana Trump got past summary judgment when her lawyers attacked her $20-million-plus-mansion-in-Connecticut postnuptial
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agreement as unconscionable. This attack gave her lawyers an important bargaining chip.
We eventually get back to Justice Grodin's critique of the oppressiveness of dealings between private parties. There is not really
time to do this topic justice, so I will just pause to note one paradox:
we have declared it to be socially intolerable for anyone else to inflict on a consenting adult the same sort of risks that he is perfectly
willing to inflict on himself. Consider smoking, the most lethal of
voluntary pastimes. Most of us agree that adults should have the
right to smoke three packs a day if they wish. But it is also thought
unconscionable to allow them to assume the vastly smaller risks of
sidestream smoke in the workplace. People may drive fast, live on
the wild side, risk life and limb in a hundred ways, so long as it is
just for kicks and without a thought; but if someone pays them to do
it and they sign a consent form, they are being oppressed.
One of the curious facts in the world of occupational safety and
health is that the most dangerous conditions and highest injury
rates occur disproportionately often in family businesses: farms,
fishing boats, backyard mines and lumbering operations, and small
construction outfits where the work force consists mostly or entirely
of the owner and family members. People are choosing an alarming
level of risk, or choosing it for their dearest family members, but
there is no visible oppressor on the scene.
On insurance bad faith, finally, I would point out that the basic
problem here is that we do not routinely award legal fees to the
prevailing party. Most countries do, which encourages insurers to
pay up promptly when they are liable on a claim. The equally welcome corollary is that fee-shifting discourages claimaints from
pressing dubious or exaggerated claims against insurers. It is about
time we joined the rest of the world on this point.
GRODIN:

I want to focus on this Carnival Cruise case because I think it is
interesting. The analysis that Professor Farnsworth offers is that the
choice of law provision is efficient in that it reduces the cruise line's
cost and therefore reduces the amount that people have to pay in
order to take a cruise. Of course, there is no denying that proposition. The same analysis is universally available. If I am admitted to
a hospital and the hospital, as a condition of admission, asks me to
sign a form waiving any liability on the part of the hospital for negligence, no matter how gross, there is no question that this provision
serves the economic interests of the hospital and indirectly the interests of patients: it lowers the costs of medical care. That kind of
argument can be used to support not only a cruise line's choice of
law provisions, but any provision in any contract. The question is,
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"What do we mean by choice?" The Shutes, we can say, did not

have to take a cruise. But what do we say to a person who is about
to enter the hospital? That he ought to ask for forms from other
hospitals to see whether he can find a hospital that will perform the
operation without such a waiver or reconsider whether, after all, he
needs an operation? For people who are concerned with contract as
an instrument of choice, I think we have to ask ourselves what we
mean by that in the real world.
And finally, one observation about the Foley case. With all respect, I do not read the Seaman's case the way Professor Farnsworth
does. I participated in the decision. I do not think that it stands
broadly for the proposition that a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the commercial context gives rise to tort
remedies. Quite the contrary. The opinion contains a lot of language-most of which I suspect Professor Farnsworth would argue
with- discussing why that might be inappropriate and rejecting the
notion that a jury should be left to determine when a breach is an
"efficient" breach.' The opinion suggests that breach of the covenant would be appropriate as a tort only in rather narrow circumstances, of which in California the insurance context is one. There
is a footnote in Seaman's suggesting that the employment context
might also be appropriate for such treatment, 2 but Foley declines to
3
accept that suggestion.
I can understand the policy arguments for why an employer
who has breached his contract with an employee, even under circumstances in which it could be said that he has done so in a manner
inconsistent with the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, should
not be subject to the range of remedies commonly associated with
tort doctrine. On the other hand, I think it has to be recognized that
the effect of the Foley case is that in California the only people who
can now bring suit against their employers for breach of contract are
people who are in the high wage brackets and whose claim is sufficient to warrant litigation. People who earn less, your Joe Boilermaker, can no more sue his employer for breach of contract as a
practical matter than, in the old days, a member of the union could
sue the union for oppressive conduct.
I find myself agreeing with Mr. Olson that the way out of this
dilemma ideally does not lie in the direction of choosing tort remedies over contract remedies, but rather by refraining the kinds of
remedies that we have for breach of contract, perhaps expanding
1 Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-70 (Cal.
1984) (passim).
2 Id. at 1166 n.6.
3 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-401 (Cal. 1988).
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them, and almost certainly including attorney's fees. I think that is
at the very heart of the problem. And it is one of the dilemmas the
courts confront in this arena.
FARNSWORTH:
I have three very quick points. The first is with respect to Mr.
Olson's remarks on franchisees. One of the things that has been left
out is that legislation is far more important than this discussion
would suggest. The law of franchisees in most states is dominated
by legislation and that is true of the whole consumer area. So as for
these stories about what courts are doing, the total impact is a lot
less important than what legislatures have done, at least in the consumer area.
On the Shute case, I may have done some disservice to Justice
Blackmun, who wrote the opinion, by giving such a short summary.
What I said was essentially his argument, not mine, and I think he
would have no difficulty in distinguishing the cruise line from the
hospital. Many states have distinguished hospitals from other activities-notably, sky diving and stock car racing come to mind-and I
wonder howJustice Grodin would deal with an exculpatory clause in
one of those two kinds of activities. Most courts have said that
though you do not choose the form on which you contract, you
choose to engage in those activities.
As to the Foley case, my discussion of that case and Seaman's consisted largely of a quotation from an intermediate court that interpreted it. 4 Review was denied on that intermediate court case by the
California Supreme Court, one judge dissenting. 5 The dissenting
judge, who apparently found fault with the lower court's description
of what happened, was the surviving member of the original Sea6
man's court, Justice Mosk.
QUESTION:

Won't many of the legislative proposals for tort reform take the
form of having the federal government act in a number of ways? My
question is prompted because we have both constitutional and contract scholars on the panel. What are the preemption implications
of these proposals for congressional action from both a policy and a
constitutional perspective?
BARNETT:

I refuse to answer, Senator, on the grounds that it may incriminate me. I really do not know that I have an answer except to say
that I am somewhat troubled by the trend to make private law mat4

5
6

Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Cal. App. 1991).
280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Cal. App. 1991) (rev. denied July 25, 1991).
Id.
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ters a matter of federal statute, which we see, for example, in the
tort reform movement. And that does not really go to the preemption question, but it does at least go to my reaction. As much as I
would like to see tort law reform and contract law reform at the local
level, I am troubled by federal legislation that would accomplish
that purpose.
OLSON:
Part of the answer to Randy's qualms is that changes injurisdiction and choice of law have unfortunately enabled states to impose
their forum and law on more and more transactions that belong in
part, often in predominant part, to other states. This in turn has
made it far easier for states to externalize the costs and internalize
the benefits of their litigation, getting money for their citizens at the
expense of citizens elsewhere. The lawsuits and the redistribution
of wealth are already interstate, and the reforms may have to be interstate as well, unless we can turn back the clock on jurisdiction and
choice of law.
QUESTION:
Mr. Olson, you present in your paper a number of outrageous,
if not humorous, cases. I wonder to what extent they are typical and
to what extent there were changes on appeal. This is a big country
and you can always find something of an oddity. Your cases are
reminiscent of those cited some years ago in the Aetna ads. I wrote
to Aetna for the citations of the cases that they had. Every one,
while it may have been costly for the parties, was reversed on
appeal.
OLSON:

I would not, in the first place, lightly brush aside the injustice of
subjecting someone to a wrongful suit simply because it does not
prevail in the end. It is cold comfort to win final vindication from a
lawsuit when you may have been absolutely ruined by the cost of
fighting it. Our legal system seems to congratulate itself over these
cases, like a doctor who pats himself on the back for finally getting
the diagnosis right although the process of taking biopsies killed the
patient.
In several of the cases I cited, there were settlements. Settlements are forever, so we know money was paid. Sometimes the settlement was after a jury verdict, sometimes before. I am relying on
newspaper accounts in the subway cases. I think they check out.
QUESTION:
Wally Olson suggested that there really is cause for gloom after
all. He suggested, I think rightly, that even if a few cases are coming
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out correctly, even if a lot of cases are coming out correctly, that this
is not the answer.
In extending from Justice Grodin's remarks about the need for
attorney's fees in the case of successful plaintiffs in certain kinds of
actions, does this suggest that there is a need for an expanded notion of the British rule on attorney's fees in the case of unsuccessful
plaintiffs?
GRODIN:

I think the question you raise is a legitimate one. It is one that I
have been concerned with a good deal. I was on a committee of the
state bar in California that was considering recommending something like the British rule, and we were on the verge of doing that
until we learned that in Britain there had been what was regarded as
very considerable reform to the rule. The reform was that plaintiffs
in consumer actions were exempt from liability for attorney's fees
on behalf of defendants. And that made us think that there are
problems with a legal situation in which someone is penalized or has
to incur substantial sanctions for bringing an action which is on the
verge of the law, which tests new principles of law, which is brought
in good faith and so forth. And I think there probably have to be
some exceptions for that.
I really am concerned, however, with the contracts situation. It
seems to me that a general principle of liability for attorney's fees
for the prevailing party is not a bad principle and that one of the
most egregious problems in the current situation is the case where
someone can say to a party to a contract: "Yeah, go sue, maybe I
owe you this money. But your lawyer is going to tell you that you
have to discount it by such an extent that you cannot afford to bring
the lawsuit." And that is not conducive to liberty or justice or anything else.
OLSON:

Two more points on the representativeness of cases and on the
legal system's role in determining injury. First, the actual decided
cases are just a small percentage. Most of the damage is being done
in negotiations and shakedowns. Second, the injury that we do not
hear enough complaints about from the trial lawyers is the injury
that litigation does to the opponent, guilty or innocent. This injury
is not exactly anecdotal. It tends to go on in every case-a 100 percent anecdote rate, if you please-and to be the routine and expected outcome of litigation in our courts.
QUESTION:

I have a two-part point to make to Professor Grodin and I
would like a response from Professor Barnett as well. I would like to
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know from Professor Grodin if he really believes that anyone has a
choice in the contracts and agreements he or she makes. It seems
from your remarks that you believe that the labor union member
does not participate in any sort of market for labor; that a person
choosing a hospital or an HMO does not really have any choice.
And I wonder if you really believe that the market does not exist
anywhere.
The second point that I have relates to some research, and I
only know it vaguely from remarks that Professor Allen Schwartz has
made at Yale. He has suggested that not every participant in a market must look at every single aspect of the choice that he or she
makes in order for the market to efficiently allocate resources. In
light of those findings, if you accept their validity, does not that reflect that only a few people have to choose the hospitals they enter,
or the cruise ships in which they embark in order for the market to
efficiently come up with the right exculpatory courses and the right
allocation of costs?
GRODIN:

Well, on the first question, I certainly do think that most contracts are the product of choice in the commercial arena. I agree
with Professor Farnsworth's distinction between the cruise ship and

the hospital. I think that while it is possible to talk about choice
among cruise ship operators with respect to choice of law provisions, I do not think that this is very meaningful. Certainly we can
talk about choice about whether one goes on a cruise ship or not
and I suppose it would not pain me if the rule were that if you go on
a cruise ship, you are stuck with whatever choice of law provision
appears on your ticket. I see a very substantial distinction between
that and the hospital situation. I do not think there is much of a
market-a real market-with respect to choice of hospitals and limitation of liability. I do not think it is realistic to talk about that. The
question then becomes where other things fit. For example, I think
that there is a lot of choice in a lot of employment relationships and
very little choice in others. We have to make decisions about the
operation of the labor market in general and we have to look at particular results. Efficiency is not everything. If the market produces a
situation in which workers are subjected to toxicity in the work
place, then that is a lousy market and we ought to do something
about it.
BARNE=t:

Obviously I take a different view of the matter. I think there is
far more choice in the market than Professor Grodin and people

who argue this position believe. The issue for them is not really
whether there is a choice or not. The issue is whether they can make
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a choice-based argument against contract in order to turn the underlying support of contract on its head. They make a choice-based
argument in order to bring about the death of contract, but they are
not really sincere in all cases in their concern about real choice.

